Frank A. Vanderlip was pivotal in shaping the nation's banking system and establishing its global economic influence.
Herbert Hoover served as the United States Food
Administrator during World War I. As the head of the Food Administration, he
was tasked with ensuring the efficient production, distribution, and
conservation of food resources at a time when the country was challenged with
feeding its own population plus its European allies.
Hoover recognized the urgent need to increase food
production and launched nationwide campaigns encouraging farmers to boost their
yields. In addition, he appealed to their patriotism, emphasizing the
importance of their contribution to the war effort. As a result, farmers were
encouraged to plant "victory gardens" in their backyards, substantially
increasing homegrown food production.
Hoover also focused on the conservation of resources. He
implemented rationing measures and introduced "Meatless Mondays" and
"Wheatless Wednesdays" to conserve supplies for the troops. These
initiatives ensured food availability and fostered a sense of solidarity among
Americans, encouraging them to make sacrifices for the greater good.
Hoover implemented food relief efforts for war-torn
Europe, establishing the United States Food Administration's American Relief
Administration (ARA), which provided crucial assistance to European countries
devastated by the war. The ARA organized and coordinated the distribution of
food aid, alleviating hunger and preventing further destabilization.
Hoover's efforts as Food Administrator earned him the
title "The Great Humanitarian." His wartime experiences shaped his
belief in the importance of international cooperation and relief efforts, providing
him with valuable insights into managing and alleviating hunger on a massive
scale. He employed that knowledge later in his relief work during and after
World War II.
Porter graduated from West
Point in 1845 and fought in the Mexican War at Veracruz, Cerro Gordo, and
Molino del Rey, among other battles. From 1849 to 1853, he served as a cavalry
and artillery instructor at West Point.
Porter’s troops were in the
thick of the fighting throughout the Seven Days Campaigns. His men often formed
the rear guard, protecting McClellan’s retreat. Porter set up the defenses at
Malvern Hill and, along with his artillery officer, Henry Hunt, placed the guns
that did their deadly work cutting up Lee’s army.
David Strother, writing as Porte Crayon, described General Heintzelman as “a grim, grizzled veteran, who looks as if he had mettle in him.”
Heintzelman graduated from
West Point in 1826, fought in the Seminole Wars in Florida, the Mexican War,
then in the expedition to put down the Yuma Indian uprising in 1851.
During the Civil War,
Heintzelman had two of the most aggressive field commanders in his
corps—Fighting Joe Hooker and Philip Kearny. As a result, his corps fought in
the thick of the action during the Peninsula Campaign and the Seven Days
Battles.
And yet, for all his military
experience, Heintzelman lacked imagination, ingenuity, and the ability to
command a large body of men. Hooker and Kearny made him look good but take them
away, and Heintzelman was lost.
Stonewall Jackson earned
his name at Stone Bridge, about four miles north of Manassas Junction. General
Barnard Bee’s troops had been under heavy fire all day. At about 2 o’clock, his
force had dwindled to almost nothing. Bee rode up and down the line encouraging
the men to give it their all. Finally, when
it looked as if everything was lost, he approached General Thomas Jackson and
said, “General, they are beating us back.”
Jackson replied, “Sir, we will give them the bayonet.”
General Bee rallied his troops and urged his men on, saying, “There is Jackson,
standing like a stone wall.” Moments later, General Bee got cut down, leading
his men into battle.
History remembers General Thomas Jackson as “Stonewall”
Jackson.
His genius on the battlefield was offset
by the quirkiness of his character. He often walked around with one arm in the
air, reportedly to balance the blood in his body. For some reason, he believed
one side of his body was heavier than the other.
He
acted the same way on horseback, often riding with one arm raised in the air.
He
was a brilliant tactician on the battlefield, second only to Robert E. Lee.
Jackson tied up Federal troops in the Shenandoah Valley for nearly a year,
fought in the Second Battle of Bull Run, forced the surrender of 12,000 Union
soldiers at Harper’s Ferry, and marched to Antietam the next day to join in the
battle there.
His wife described him as a quiet, solitary,
closed-mouth individual. “He was a character apart; a man of mystery; silent
and uncommunicative.” He asked no advice, “forming his own plans, which those
nearest to him could not penetrate and hardly dared to conjecture, and which were
disclosed only to his military family only when he gave his orders for the
march and battle.”
D. H. Hill said Stonewall “Jackson’s genius never shone
out when under the command of another.” That was true. Jackson let Lee down
twice during the Seven Days Battles. First, when he arrived a day late for the
battle of Mechanicsville (or Beaver Dam Creek) and again at Glendale (or
Frayser’s Farm) when he sat the fight out.
What everyone did agree on was that Jackson was quick.
Super quick. The Chicago Daily Tribune suggested that “with his swift
movements from field to field, Stonewall Jackson’s sobriquet should be changed
to Stonewall ‘Portable Fence’ Jackson.”
It’s easy to understand why Burnside became a founding member and served as the first president of the NRA.
He was appointed a brigadier general of volunteers after the first battle of Bull Run. He commanded three brigades in the North Carolina Expeditionary Force. Later, at Antietam, McClellan ordered him to take stone bridge number 3 and cut off the rebel army outside Sharpsburg.
Less than a month after the battle of Antietam,
Abraham Lincoln removed George McClellan and appointed Ambrose Burnside as
commander of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside insisted he was unfit for
command, but Lincoln persisted. In his biography of Ulysses S. Grant, Ron Chernow described
Burnside as a “military lightweight” who “was in way over his head.”[i]
In an interview conducted after the war, Ulysses
S. Grant appeared to concur. He said Burnside was well-liked and respected but
unfit to command an army. At best, he should have been made a colonel.
Robert E. Lee was an unlikely rebel. His father, Henry “Light Horse” Lee, gave the famous eulogy for George Washington, saying he was: “First in War, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen.” His wife, Mary Anna Custis Lee, was the great-granddaughter of Martha Washington.
In April 1861, Abraham
Lincoln offered Lee command of the Federal forces. Despite his strong feelings
for the Union, Lee declined and returned to Virginia, where he became a general
in that State’s army.
Initially, Lee served
as a military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Then, in June
1862, Davis appointed him the Army of Northern Virginia commander after General
Joseph E. Johnston was injured during fighting in the Peninsular Campaign.
Lee attacked
McClellan’s army three weeks later and, in savage fighting during the Seven
Days’ Campaign, forced the Union army out of the Peninsula. That saved Richmond
for the time being.
As the war continued,
Lee realized he needed to change his strategy. Rather than keep fighting
McClellan in Virginia, he brought the fighting closer to Washington and shifted
his campaign to Maryland. The move had several advantages for Lee. First, it
would force McClellan to pull his troops out of Virginia, taking some pressure
off Richmond. It would give his army a better chance at forage than Virginia,
where they had already stripped the country bare. And, if his campaign proved
successful, he hoped to pick up new recruits from Maryland.
The Army of Northern
Virginia marched into Maryland on September 4. Once inside Maryland, Robert E.
Lee divided his army of 55,000 men into four parts. He posted General James
Longstreet to Boonsboro, then Hagerstown. Stonewall Jackson rode off to
Harper’s Ferry to capture the government arsenal there, and D. H. Hill and JEB
Stuart stood guard in the rear at South Mountain.
Unfortunately for Lee,
Corporal Barton Mitchell of the 27th Indiana Infantry discovered a lost copy of
his Special Order 191 on September 13. It gave McClellan a blueprint showing
all the movements for the Army of Northern Virginia during the Maryland
campaign.
For the over-cautious
McClellan, it must have seemed like a Godsend. He quickened his pace and met
Lee at South Mountain the next day. But unfortunately, McClellan settled for a
partial victory. That set Stonewall Jackson up for his victory at Harper’s
Ferry and allowed the rest of Lee’s army to escape to Sharpsburg, where he
would soon have another showdown with General George McClellan and his Army of
the Potomac.
Albert Sidney Johnston was one of the most respected generals on either side at the start of the civil war, but the first days of fighting didn’t go his way.
Ulysses S. Grant proved a thorn in his
side almost from the very beginning. Grant marched into Paducah, Kentucky, the
same day the Confederates planned to move on the city. After that, he captured
Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, then positioned his army to march into Mississippi.
Johnston concentrated his army around
Corinth, Mississippi. Grant inched closer, moving his army to Pittsburg Landing
just twenty miles away. Then, early in April, Johnston learned General Don Carlos
Buell’s army planned to meet up with Grant, then launch a concentrated attack
on Corinth.
On April 3rd, Johnston ordered General P. G. T. Beauregard to attack
Grant’s army at Pittsburg Landing before the two armies could hook up. It might
have worked—except for the weather. It stormed so bad on April 4th
that it slowed the army’s progress, so they could not attack until the 6th.
That allowed Buell to arrive in time for the second day of the fighting.
Johnston died early in the fighting on
the first day. Later, Jefferson Davis would say Johnston’s death was “the
turning point of our fate.” It shows the faith he placed in his old West Point
classmate, but it also makes one wonder—Did Davis have doubts about the war’s
outcome almost from the beginning?
Grant had reservations about Albert
Sidney Johnston. However, he didn’t “question the personal courage of General Johnston or his ability.” While “he did not win
the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends,” wrote Grant. “He did
prove that as a general, he was overestimated.”
If it hadn’t been for the war, John C. Breckinridge might have been president of the United States. He served as vice president under James Buchanan, campaigned for president in 1860, and in 1861 was appointed a Kentucky senator. After Kentucky sided with the Union, Breckinridge fled to the South.
In November 1861, he
took command of the “Orphan Brigade,” made up mostly of Kentuckians who felt
abandoned after that state declared for the Union.
The Orphan Brigade lost
nearly a third of their men at Shiloh. On the first day of fighting, they caged
General Prentiss up at the Hornet’s Nest so he’d be forced to surrender. The
next day they stood firm near Shiloh Church so
that the others could make good on their escape. “This was hard duty,” said Colonel R. P. Trabue, “exposed
as the command had been and wasted as they were by the loss of half their
numbers.”
Sherman reentered the service at the start of the civil war.
After Bull Run, Lincoln promoted him to brigadier general of volunteers. His
next position with the Army of the Cumberland in Tennessee was the low point of
Sherman’s military career. He grew paranoid about how small and unprepared his
army was and called for 200,000 troops to support him.
Soon, the newspapers were having a field day labeling Sherman as
crazy or insane.
For a while, it looked
like his career was over. The New York
Herald reported Sherman wasn’t insane, but “he certainly acted strangely when he was in Kentucky… he has been known for many years as extremely
eccentric man and liable to all sorts of freaks of judgment.” The Herald
felt safe in saying Sherman would “never have an important command again.”
Two months later, Sherman was back in the field serving with
Grant at Fort Donelson and then at Shiloh. While Sherman proved his bravery at
Shiloh, his troops were among the first to turn and run.
He defended them as best he could. “My division was made up of regiments perfectly new,” explained
Sherman, “nearly all having received their muskets for the first time at
Paducah. None of them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them…To expect of them the coolness and steadiness
of older troops would be wrong.”
When he recollected Pittsburg Landing in his memoirs, Sherman
defended Grant for not building intrenchments. “The battle of Shiloh, or
Pittsburg Landing,” said Sherman, “was one of the most fiercely contested of
the war.” The reason they hadn’t dug in was simple. They never figured
Beauregard would leave his fortifications at Corinth. General Grant planned to force the rebels out once Buell’s army
arrived.
When the war broke out, he presented
himself to Governor Richard Yates of Illinois. Yates didn’t know what to make
of him. He said Grant’s “appearance at first is not striking…He was plain, very
plain.” That’s what everyone would say throughout the war. Grant stood a little
better than five foot nothing, weighed a hundred and thirty pounds, and tended
to blend in with the scenery. On his first official visit to Washington,
Lincoln asked Grant to stand on a sofa so people could get a better look at
him.
In
September 1861, after a little prodding from Congressman Elihu Washburne,
Lincoln appointed Grant, a brigadier
general of volunteers headquartered in Cairo, Illinois.
From
there, the legend grew.
Six
days after arriving at Cairo, Grant loaded his men on the Steamer Mound City and set off to capture
Paducah, Kentucky. After that, he made a somewhat disastrous attack on Belmont,
Missouri. Then, starting in February 1862, Grant launched a miraculous string
of victories. His army captured Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in Tennessee,
which led Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston to pull his troops out of
Tennessee. No shots were fired as General
William “Bull” Nelson marched his forces into Nashville, following close on the
heels of the retreating rebels.
General
Ulysses S. Grant waited outside of Pittsburg Landing, poised to take Shiloh,
Corinth, Richmond, then the Confederacy.
General George McClellan was at his best strategizing, organizing, and planning. His comfort zone would have been a bureaucratic position buried deep within the war department. Henry Halleck’s position would have suited him just fine. But instead, McClellan was the commander of the Army of the Potomac, readying his troops for battle.
At Antietam, he planned a three-pronged attack.
General Joseph Hooker took the lead and was ordered to establish his base on the right. Sumner, Mansfield, and Franklin were to support Hooker while all the time edging their way toward the center. The center was left mainly to Porter’s artillery.
The fly in the ointment was General Ambrose Burnside. The entire action depended on his taking stone bridge number 3, then turning the rebel’s left flank, thus cutting off any chance of a rebel retreat. McClellan considered giving the over-cautious general more men, but he didn’t have anyone to spare.
His battle plan completed, McClellan moved to his observation post on a high hill overlooking the field. From there, he could watch the action unfold. Then, he could quickly dash to wherever his presence was needed. But most often, his messengers raced off delivering messages for his commanders to change fronts, advance, fallback, or pick up the pace.
McClellan’s all-seeing eye would determine the outcome of the battle. The life and death of nearly 100,000 men hung on the decisions he made—or didn’t make.
Monday, September 16, found the Confederates deployed in force on a crescent-shaped ridge that followed the course of Antietam Creek. The funny thing was they didn’t seem worried about the increasing number of Union troops making their way to the field. They didn’t even seek cover from the Union artillery barrages. The correspondent for the New York Tribune suggested it was an act. The rebels wanted to look stronger than they were.
McClellan assumed Lee was buying time, so he
could fortify his position and dig his troops in even deeper. As the day wore on, reinforcements poured in. Stonewall
Jackson’s troops left Harper’s Ferry Tuesday and marched all night to reach
Antietam in time to join the battle. General A. P. Hill moved his troops down
from Harper’s Ferry and arrived just in time to stop Burnside’s attack on
Sharpsburg.
General George McClellan’s victory at Antietam proved a double-edged sword for Abraham Lincoln. The victory gave Lincoln the courage to issue his partial emancipation proclamation. It also stopped England and France from recognizing the Confederacy, ensuring the belligerents would receive no outside help during the rebellion.
As for the battle itself, Lincoln and McClellan interpreted it differently. While McClellan saw Antietam as a victory, Abraham Lincoln viewed it as a lost opportunity.
Shortly after the battle,
Lincoln visited McClellan’s encampment near Antietam. Early that morning, he
walked the battlefield with Ozias M. Hatch, Illinois Secretary of State. When
they reached the outskirts of the camp, Lincoln threw his arms in the air,
motioning to the army, and asked wonderingly, “What is all this?” Then, answering
his own question, he whispered, “General
McClellan’s bodyguard.”
That same day Lincoln warned
McClellan about his “over-cautiousness” to attack the enemy.
It was clear that Abraham Lincoln was happy with the victory. What worried him was what came next. He would feel the same way after the Battle of Gettysburg. General George Gordon Meade had won the battle but thrown away “the golden ticket.” He stayed in place and failed to chase down the fleeing Confederates.
Soon after the battle at Gettysburg, Lincoln would write: “Now don’t misunderstand me, I am profoundly grateful down to the bottom of my boots for what he did at Gettysburg, but I think that if I had been General Meade, I would have fought another battle.”
Lincoln
expected McClellan to chase after Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.
When that didn’t happen, George McClellan’s days as commander of the Army of
the Potomac became numbered.
Gunboat Tyler |
At 6 a.m., all hell busted out along Sherman's lines. By
half-past eight o'clock, the fighting had spread
across the entire front. The Cincinnati
Times correspondent said thousands of stragglers clogged the roads. For
many of them, this was their first taste of battle. From the looks of things,
they did not find it “much to their liking.” The stragglers drifted toward the
river, and “neither persuasion nor threats could induce them to change their
course.”
“Foot by foot, the
ground was contested.” By the end of the day,
“a single narrow strip of open land dividing the opponents” was all the ground
the Union had left. The sound of artillery and musket fire was deafening. Men
fell in bloody piles. The men behind them stepped over their fallen bodies as
they would walk over fallen logs.
The gunboat Tyler
made its way upriver and joined in the fighting early in the afternoon. “The
shell went tearing and crashing through the woods, felling trees in their
course and spreading havoc everywhere they fell.”[i]
The gunfire from the ship helped check the rebel advance on the left.
At five o'clock, the rebel fire ceased momentarily as they fell
back to their center. Then just as quickly, they wheeled about and attacked the
left wing with all their forces. At about that same time, General Buell’s
command arrived. Grant directed the gunboats Tyler and Lexington to a position
a half-mile above Pittsburg Landing, where they let loose a terrible and
murderous cannonading. Not long after that, General Lew Wallace’s troops
arrived at the landing.
That convinced General Beauregard to call it quits for the
day. The rebels slowly fell back to their center on the Corinth road.
The Gunboat Cincinnati |
On May 16, 1861, McClellan ordered Commander
John Rodgers to establish a navy on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. Rodgers
bought three wooden ships for $62,000 and had them converted into the first
gunboats on the Mississippi. They were the Lexington, Conestoga, and Tyler. The
boats were fast because they were wooden, but for the same reason, were had to
keep their distance from the shore batteries at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.
Within a few months, the government began
building ironclads. They were constructed by James B. Eads, who later built the
Mississippi River bridge at St. Louis. The new ironclads included the Cairo,
Carondelet, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Louisville, Mound City, and Pittsburgh. They
modernized the navy on the Mississippi and made it possible for Grant to move
on Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. After that, the fleet assisted John Pope in
taking Island No. 10 and, again, in the Vicksburg campaign.
The new boats were called city-class ironclads
or “Pooks Turtles” after their designer Samuel M. Pook. They were shallow-draft
vessels that drew only six feet and carried thirteen guns. Because of their
immense size and weight, the city-class boats were slow and often required a
tow to move them around faster. Each ship carried three front-facing guns, four
on each side and two in the rear. The Ironclads joined the Western fleet in
January 1862.
Because the boats belonged to the army, not
the navy, their use required close cooperation between the army and the
gunboats. Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote was the man the navy sent the army to
captain the boats. Foote was a forty-year Navy veteran who had sailed all over
the world. He spent several years blocking the slave trade on the African coast.
In 1859, he published a book about his experiences called Africa and the American Flag. Before the war, he oversaw the Brooklyn
Navy Yard.
Foote was a character all his own. He didn’t
drink and expected the same abstinence from his officers. But whatever his
eccentricities, Foote meshed well with Grant, and they set a new standard for
army-navy cooperation.
It was a risky move.
Lee’s army was beaten;
his men half-starved. Many didn’t have decent clothing or shoes; others
lingered on the sick list and struggled to follow the army as it marched into
Maryland.
“We cannot afford to
be idle,” said Lee in a letter explaining his actions to Jefferson Davis. “The
movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible.”
Lee didn’t need to
destroy the Union army, just its fighting spirit. The midterm elections were
coming up. Northerners were fed up with all the fighting, killing, and money
spent to fuel the administration’s war machine. If he could win another battle
or two, Lee figured it might bring Lincoln to the table so that he could
negotiate a peace on his terms.
What Lee did know was
he couldn’t linger in Northern Virginia. A year of heavy fighting had stripped
the area of food and fodder.
Delay could kill his
army.
Contrary to what
Northerners believed, Robert E. Lee had no intention of attacking Washington.
That would have been suicide. However, his threat of doing so was enough to
force the White House to pull tens of thousands of troops out of his path. In
an 1868 letter, Lee explained that he never intended to attack Washington. He
just wanted it to seem that way. His primary reason for crossing the Potomac
into Maryland was to feed his troops and force General McClellan to move his
army north of the Potomac.
Lee’s movement threw
Lincoln and Stanton into a panic.
They were sure that
Bobby Lee planned an excursion to the White House. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew
Curtain felt an invasion of his state was imminent. So, he called out the
militia and bullied Abraham Lincoln into releasing General John Gibbon from the
Army of the Potomac so that Gibbon could lead his State’s forces.